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ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A, THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE 
BOARD DID NOT DENY APPELLANTS DUE PROCESS WHEN THE BOARD FAILED 
TO ALLOW PETITIONERS A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME TO PRESENT THEIR 
CASE AND CROSS EXAMINE WITNESSES. 
The United States Department of the Army, and their 
contractor, EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. [hereinafter "Federal 
Intervenor"] start out their section on the due process issue 
with a perplexing argument on the proper standard of review. 
Brief of Intervenors United States Department of the Army and 
EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. ("Federal Br.") at 43, n. 14. The 
Federal Intervenor admits that because this is a legal issue, the 
Court reviews it under the correction of error standard. The 
Federal Intervenor goes on, however, to claim that the abuse of 
discretion standard also applies. Id. The Federal Intervenor 
does not even offer a theory on how two standards of review apply 
to one issue. To the extent that the Federal Intervenor claims 
that the abuse of discretion standard applies to the due process 
issue, it is wrong. 
The due process issue, which is a question of law, is 
reviewed under the correction-of-error standard that gives no 
deference to the agency's decision. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm., 817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991). The Federal 
Intervenor provides the Court with an out of context quote from 
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Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994) to claim 
that the due process issue should be reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. The quote provided by the Federal Intervenor is 
about the standard of review for a relevancy issue. Id. As an 
evidence issue, relevancy is indeed reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. However, that is not applicable to the due process 
issue. 
In the next case cited by the Federal Intervenor, Berrett v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 
App.) cert, denied 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) the issue was the 
propriety of the trial court's excluding a witness as a discovery 
violation sanction. While this is little help in determining the 
standard of review for a due process violation, it is worthwhile 
noting that this Court held that "[e]xcluding a witness from 
testifying is, however, extreme in nature and . . . should be 
employed only with caution and restraint." Id. (citations 
omitted). This Court found that excluding a witness for a 
discovery violation was indeed an abuse of discretion and 
overturned the trial court's decision. Id. at 297 - 298. 
Turning to the federal case law cited by the Federal 
Intervenor, Adkins v. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, 101 
F.3d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1996) involves a challenge to a procedural 
rule promulgated by an agency and equally applicable to all 
parties. As in most rule making, the United States Court of 
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deferred to the agency. However, 
the Petitioners are not challenging a rule making. Rather they 
are challenging how their particular trial-type hearing was 
conducted. The Federal Intervenor offers no case law to support 
a deferential review of this sort of challenge. 
In Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Comm'n, 883 F.2d 117, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1989) the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not 
address the merits of the due process claim because that court 
lacked jurisdiction. The quote provided by the Federal 
Intervenor is referring to deference given to an agency rule 
making; in that case a rule making for a discovery rule. Id. at 
125. 
Finally, Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commyn, 563 F.2d 191, 200 (5th Cir. 1977) involved the question 
of what process is due in an informal rulemaking. Again, this is 
not helpful in deciding the standard of review regarding the 
current issue. 
As a second threshold issue, the Federal Intervenor claims 
that due process violations require a showing of substantial 
prejudice unless there are egregious procedural constraints. 
Federal Br. at 45, n. 15. None of the cases cited mention 
anything about a rule requiring an egregious violation before a 
showing of substantial prejudice is waived. 
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Moreover, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney/ 818 P.2d 23 
(Utah App* 1991) did not involve a particularly egregious 
procedural constraint. The plaintiff was denied the right to 
cross examine a declarant of a statement even though the 
plaintiff could cross examine the witness who testified as to the 
declarant's statement. Id. at 30. Nonetheless, this Court held: 
This court recognized in D.B. that the denial of an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine a key witness 
requires a new hearing, even if it appears that the 
agency's decision may have had an adequate basis absent 
tainted evidence. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Turning to the substance, the Federal Intervenor claims that 
because the Petitioners did not challenge the limit on their time 
until the trial had begun, they should lose their right to 
complain. The Federal Intervenor offers no support for this 
proposition. 
In re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387 (Colo.App. 1989) 
addresses this exact issue. In that case, the court held that 
the fact that counsel had miscalculated the time needed to 
present the case did not matter. Id. at 1389. Due process still 
required that the parties be given a reasonable opportunity to 
present their case and cross examine witnesses. Id. 
This is especially so in this case. To begin with, the time 
the Board used asking the Petitioner's witnesses questions was 
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charged against the Petitioners* There is no way the Petitioners 
could have accurately predicted how much time this would be. 
Moreover, the nature of this action required the Petitioners 
to rely on adverse and even hostile witnesses. TOCDF is on a 
military base. It processes deadly chemical warfare materials. 
Security is so strict that the use of lethal force has been 
authorized to keep trespassers out. In a situation such as this, 
Petitioners must present their case through adverse or hostile 
witnesses, making the task of predicting the time needed nearly 
impossible. 
This fact also refutes the Federal Intervener's next point. 
The Federal Intervenor blame the Petitioners for the due process 
violation, claiming that the Petitioners used their time poorly. 
Federal Br. at 45 - 46. The Federal Intervenor tries to support 
this argument by citing to their counsel's oral argument on this 
issue. See Federal Br. at 46 citing IR-164 at 719 (oral argument 
of Craig Galli, counsel for EG&G Defense Materials, Inc.). Of 
course, EG&G's counsel's advocacy via oral argument is not 
evidence. 
As further support, the Federal Intervenor states that 
Petitioners offered live testimony of Dennis Downs while also 
offering the deposition of Mr. Downs as an exhibit. To begin 
with, the Petitioners should not have to defend this practice. 
In civil litigation and administrative proceedings involving 
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matters as grave as the permitting of a facility that burns 
chemical weapons, the typical procedure is to both depose 
witnesses and then present their live testimony to the fact 
finder. There is no reasonable explanation for why the 
Petitioners should have been afforded less of an opportunity than 
is typical in a case where the public health and safety is at 
stake* 
Furthermore, live testimony has a value to the fact finder 
that a deposition does not. This fact is the basis of a good 
many of the standards of review for appellate courts. Mr. Downs 
was the key decision maker in issuing the permits that are the 
subject of this case. Therefore, it was a reasonable, and 
probably absolutely necessary, decision for the Petitioners to 
present Mr. Down's live testimony. 
Finally, there is the consideration that the Board is not 
made up of judges, but rather of volunteers. Asking the Board to 
read a two volume deposition, in addition to all of the other 
exhibits they had, was a risky proposition. It was one the 
Petitioners could not afford to take. 
The Federal Intervener's next argument is that because the 
Board rescheduled the hearing twice, it was acceptable for the 
Board not to allow the Petitioners to put on their case and cross 
examine witnesses. Federal Br. at 46. The two situations are 
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unrelated. Therefore, the Federal Intervener's argument does not 
make sense. 
The Federal Intervener's next try to bolster their argument 
with selected cases from outside of Utah. Federal Br. at 46 -
47. An examination of the cases shows that they do not support 
the Federal Intervener's position. 
The Federal Intervenor cites to Clark v. Board of Directors 
of Kansas City School District, 915 S.W.2d 766, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1996). In that case, a teacher was appealing his termination. 
The court found that the teacher's strongest argument was that he 
was denied due process because of the time limits imposed on him 
by the administrative tribunal. Id. at 772. However, the court 
ruled against the teacher on this issue because the teacher 
failed to raise this issue in the administrative process. Id. 
Like most appellate courts, the Missouri court would not decide 
an issue that was raised for the first time on appeal. 
Therefore, the only thing the Federal Intervener's should have 
cited this case for is that the dicta in it supports the 
Petitioners' claim. 
Before looking at the next two cases, the Petitioners would 
like to restate what the Federal Intervener's have already 
pointed out. That is that due process requires "such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands." Federal Br. at 
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44 - 45 citing Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Depft, 616 P.2d 598, 
602 (Utah 1980) . 
Apparently having scoured the legal landscape, the best 
support the Federal Intervenor's could find was In re Application 
of Lamb, 539 N.W.2d 865, 866-67 (N.D. 1995). See Federal Br. at 
47. In that case, the appellant failed the bar examination. Id. 
at 866. Despite this fact, the appellant still wanted to be 
admitted to practice law and was challenging the process given 
him to challenge his denial of admission to the bar. Id. The 
North Dakota court noted in a cursory fashion that the appellant 
had been given adequate time to present his case. Id. at 867. 
This was a case involving the privilege, for admission to 
the bar is not a right, of one person. At stake was possibly 
some degree of economic well being for this one person. The 
person's case was weak to begin with, as he was challenging a 
test at least half of which was not administered by the 
defendants but was administered on a nation wide basis. 
In contrast, the present case involves the health and safety 
as well as economic and psychological well being of a great many 
people. Even if the Board believed that dioxin, PCBs and the 
other toxic chemicals released from TOCDF were "good" for people, 
this case is a grave matter based on the fact that it involves 
dissembling chemical warfare agent in explosively configured 
weapons and then the incomplete burning of the chemical warfare 
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agents GB (Sarin), VX and mustard "gas." The process due in this 
case cannot reasonably be compared to a bar examination failure's 
challenge. 
Similarly, Childs v. Copper Valley Elec. Assoc, 860 P.2d 
1184, 1190 (Alaska 1993) involved an individual's appeal from a 
worker's compensation case. To begin with, worker's compensation 
cases are a high volume area, both for the agency and the courts. 
In contrast, the present case is the only one the Board and this 
Court will ever see challenging a facility's permit to begin 
operations with live chemical warfare agent. Therefore, it is 
reasonable that more process is due in this unique and critically 
important situation. 
Similarly, the worker's compensation involved the economic 
well being of an individual or at most, a small group of 
individuals. The present case, on the other hand, as stated, 
involves the health, safety and economic well being of a great 
many people. Furthermore, the subject matter in this case is 
almost assuredly more complex and definitely more voluminous than 
in the worker's compensation case. Therefore, what is a 
reasonable process to decide the case must be appropriately 
adjusted. 
Petitioners do not mean to suggest, however, that plaintiffs 
should be given short shrift in less complicated cases. Rather, 
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Petitioners urge the Court to follow the well reasoned case of In 
re Marriage of Goellner, 770 P.2d 1387 (Colo.App. 1989). 
Goellner involved the relatively serious matter of a divorce 
where there was a serious custody dispute. Id. at 1388. While 
not a chemical weapons incineration, none the less the well being 
of at least one child was a stake. Based on representations from 
counsel, the trial court allowed each side six hours to present 
their case. Id. at 1388. The mother used five and a half hours 
on cross examination which only left her a half hour to present 
her case in chief. Id. The trial court refused to allow the 
mother any addition time. Id. 
The appellate court held that this was a violation of the 
mother's due process rights. Id, at 1389. This conclusion was 
reached despite the fact that the appellate court also found that 
the mother's trial counsel had miscalculated the time needed for 
the case. Id. The appellate court held: 
Nevertheless, while dockets in the domestic relations 
division of the court may be crowded, and while the 
trial court may have an obligation to move matters 
before it as rapidly as possible, litigants are 
nevertheless entitled to have sufficient time to make 
an orderly presentation of their case. 
Id. (citation omitted) 
As in Goellner, the Petitioners wanted the opportunity to 
fully cross examine all of the opposing parties' witnesses as 
well as present their own witnesses. At most this would have 
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taken a day or two more- Considering how many people's health 
and safety and economic interests are at stake in this case, the 
Petitioners' request was certainly reasonable. 
B. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE 
APPELLANTS LACK STANDING — PETITIONERS1 STANDING SHOULD BE 
RECOGNIZED IN THIS CASE INVOLVING UNIQUE ISSUES OF GREAT PUBLIC 
IMPORTANCE, IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
Respondent Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
("Board") argues that the Petitioners do not have standing. 
Brief of Respondent Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Board 
("Board Br.") at 9 - 11. The Board is wrong. 
The Board correctly points out that in Utah courts, a 
plaintiff or petitioner can establish standing in one of three 
ways. Board Br. at 9. See also National Parks and Conservation 
Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1993)("National Parks"). One way to establish standing is if 
"'the issues are unique and of such great public importance that 
they ought to be decided in furtherance of the public interest.1 
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799; see also Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148-
50." Board Br. at 10. This is clearly such a case. 
The issues are unique. Before this case, the Board has 
never decided whether to issue a permit modification to begin 
full scale live chemical warfare agent and chemical weapons 
disposal operations to a facility. In fact, in recent times no 
agency has been faced with the issue of whether to issue such a 
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permit modification for any facility within the continental 
United States. 
The issues are also of great public importance. TOCDF is 
designed to burn over 10,000 tons of lethal nerve agents and 
blister agents, as well as explosives and propellants. The Board 
admits that one of the issues is whether the risk of continued 
storage of these chemical weapons is greater than the risk of 
their incineration. Board Br. at 10. By risk, the Board of 
course is referring to the risk of countless people being killed 
or injured by exposure to deadly chemical weapons. This matter 
is of obvious and great public importance. Likewise, the issue 
of which company is permitted to operate this dangerous facility 
is also of great public importance. 
However, what is not of importance for the standing analysis 
is what side of the issue the Board came out on. If that was of 
consequence, then no Appellant would ever have standing because 
all denials of permit challenges include a finding of no injury. 
Had the Board found injury to the Petitioners or the public from 
operation of the Tooele facility, Utah law would have required 
denial of the permit and modifications in question. Standing, of 
course, cannot be interpreted in such a manner as to make it an 
absolute bar to all appellants in all permit challenge cases. 
Sierra Club v. Department of Environmental Quality, 857 P.2d 
982 (Utah App. 1993) is easily distinguishable from the present 
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case. In that case, the plaintiff was challenging the failure to 
conduct proper emergency planning as well as the completeness 
determination by the agency regarding the permit application. 
Id. at 986-987. Because the plaintiff was not challenging the 
actual beginning of operations with hazardous waste, but was 
rather challenging a few of the preliminary procedural steps in 
the permitting process, this Court found that the case was not of 
great public importance. Id. at 987. 
In contrast, in the present case, the Petitioners are 
challenging the beginning of operations with live chemical 
warfare agent as well as which company will conduct these 
operations. See Brief of Interveners United States Department of 
the Army and EG&G Defense Materials, Inc. ("Army Brief") at 5 
(adopted by Board Brief at 5). See also Petitioners' First and 
Second Request for Agency Action, attached as Addendum C & D to 
the Board Brief. Thus, this is an appeal of permit modification 
decisions of great importance. 
National Parks establishes that Petitioners have standing 
under the second standing test. The second standing test is 
whether the plaintiff can establish that there are important 
public issues and no one else has a greater interest in the 
outcome of the case and the issues are unlikely to be addressed 
if no one else raises them. National Parks, 869 P.2d at 913. 
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In National Parks/ the Supreme Court found that the 
plaintiff was founded to address the issue raised in the case, 
that is the preservation of national parks. Id, The legal 
interest raised was the possible inimical environmental effects 
on the park. Id, 
Based on these facts, the Supreme Court found that although 
others may have an interest in the issues in the case, it was 
unlikely that anyone would have a greater interest in the case 
than the plaintiff. Id, Finally, the Supreme Court held that 
the proper discharging of the State's fiduciary duties was an 
important public issue. Id, at 913-14. 
The present case essentially tracks National Parks. 
Petitioner, the Chemical Weapons Working Group ("CWWG") "is 
dedicated to protecting public health and the environment in 
communities around the sites proposed by the Army for chemical 
weapons disposal." Petitioners1 First Request for Agency Action 
at 2. See also Petitioners' Second Request for Agency Action at 
2 (same). CWWG's interest in the case is the environmental 
damage TOCDF will cause to the community around it. Id. at 2-3. 
Based on these facts, it is unlikely that any other group 
will have a greater interest in this case. Moreover, the burning 
of weapons filled with deadly chemical warfare agent is an issue 
of great importance to the public. 
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Finally, even under the traditional test for standing, the 
Petitioners have standing. Under this test, 
whether a plaintiff has the requisite personal stake to 
challenge a governmental action turns on (1) the 
existence of an adverse impact on the plaintiff's 
rights, (2) a causal relationship between the 
government action that is challenged and the adverse 
impact on the plaintiff's rights, and (3) the 
likelihood that the relief requested will redress the 
injury claimed. 
National Parks, 869 P.2d at 913 (citations omitted). 
Petitioners have alleged that the pollution from the burning 
of chemical weapons at TOCDF will adversely impact the 
Petitioners rights to live, work, recreate and reside in the area 
impacted by TOCDF's emissions. Petitioner's First Request for 
Agency Action at 2-3; Petitioner's Second Request for Agency 
Action at 2-5. Considerable evidence detailing the dangerous 
nature of the toxic chemical emissions from the Tooele chemical 
weapons incineration facility were presented to the Board and run 
throughout the record. The issuance of a permit modification to 
begin burning chemical weapons, which is what is being 
challenged, is directly related to the adverse impact alleged. 
If the permit had not have been issued, there would be no impact. 
Similarly, if the permit modification is revoked, the adverse 
impact will be redressed- Therefore, even under the traditional 
three part standing analysis, the Petitioners have standing. 
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It is true that others among the public beyond the 
Petitioners may be harmed by the Board's permit decisions and the 
subsequent actions of the Federal Intervenors in operating the 
chemical weapons facility in question. However, this fact does 
not diminish Petitioners' standing. As the United States Supreme 
Court has noted: 
... standing is not to be denied simply because many 
people suffer the same injury. Indeed some of the 
cases on which we relied in Sierra Club demonstrated 
the patent fact that persons across the Nation could be 
adversely affected by major governmental actions... To 
deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply 
because many others are also injured, would mean that 
the most injurious and widespread Government actions 
could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that 
conclusion. 
U.S. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 - 688 (1973). 
C. THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENORS ERR IN ASSERTING THAT THE 
BOARD'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD DUE TO AN ALLEGED FAILURE BY 
APPELLANT TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE. 
The Board asserts that the Board's findings should be 
accepted by this Court because of an alleged failure of 
Petitioners to marshal the evidence. Board Brief at 11-13. 
However, according to the Board's own Brief, the caselaw 
establishing the rule on marshalling evidence applies only to 
challenges to findings of fact. Id., at 11. The Board fails to 
note that Petitioners in this appeal are asserting several pure 
errors of law to which the marshalling rule would not apply. A 
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prime example is the due process violation committed by the Board 
in denying Petitioners a reasonable time to present their case, 
discussed supra, 
A second clear example is the Board's error of law in 
granting a permit modification to allow EG&G to be operator of 
the Tooele facility after the record reflects EG&G operated the 
facility for many months without a permit in blatant violation of 
Utah hazardous waste laws. The issue of whether EG&G acted in 
violation of law prior to the permit modification adding EG&G to 
the permit is not a fact issue but rather is a question of the 
legal significance of the facts that lie undisputed in the 
record. Likewise, once the legal determination is made that EG&G 
acted in violation of State law in operating the Tooele hazardous 
waste facility without a permit for many months, then a second 
legal issue, not fact issue is raised. That second legal issue 
is whether Utah law requires the Board to deny EG&G the right to 
operate the Tooele facility because of its past violations and 
disrespect for Utah law. The rule on the marshalling of evidence 
regarding challenges to factual findings does not apply to these 
type of issues and arguments raised by Petitioners. 
The Board cites three examples of Petitioners arguments on 
appeal to which the Board believes the marshalling rule applies. 
Board Brief at 11-13. The first is Petitioners' argument that 
the record reflects an unacceptable health risk to infants 
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resulting from toxic chemical emissions from the Tooele chemical 
weapons incineration facility. Petitioners do argue in this 
appeal that the Board erred in granting the permit and 
modifications of the permit for operation of the Tooele facility 
in light of the cancer and non-cancer risk to infants, children 
and adults. See, e.g., Petitioners1 opening Brief at 36-37. 
However, Petitioners' appeal regarding these health risks 
does not involve challenging fact findings made by the Board 
contrary to Petitioners assertions, but rather challenges the 
legal errors made by the Board in misconstruing the legal 
significance of undisputed facts in the record either 
acknowledged by the Board or ignored in the Board's Order (i.e. 
either the Board made fact findings in agreement with 
Petitioners' fact assertions or made no fact findings on the 
question that could be challenged). For example, the Board does 
not make fact findings contradicting Petitioners1 assertion that 
the State Agency itself (the Department of Environmental Quality 
or DEQ whose initial permit decision the Board has upheld) 
calculated in its own health risk assessment for the Tooele 
facility that the infant would receive a dose of dioxin 50 times 
greater than the federal Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry would consider safe. 
The record reflects this fact as undisputed. See PX 4; PX 
44. The calculations were done by the State's own consultants 
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and the record reflects without dispute that the State made no 
determination that this high dioxin dose to the infant was safe. 
The State Agency offered no evidence to dispute the fact that the 
State had performed the risk calculations showing the high dioxin 
dose to the infant or to assert that the calculations were in 
error. The State simply asserted that it was not error to omit 
the infant from consideration in the final risk assessment and in 
their permit decision based on the asserted absence of an EPA 
reference standard for dioxin non-cancer risk (the presence of 
the ATSDR reference standard was not disputed). The Board's 
error in disregarding the legal significance of this undisputed 
evidence is an error of law. 
Likewise, the record reflects an admission by the Federal 
intervener's own risk expert, Dr. Findley, that the dose of 
dioxin he calculated for the infant would be greater than the 
reference dose for dioxin indicated in the EPA's 1994 Dioxin 
Health Assessment report. IR 164 at 876-78. These key facts 
regarding danger to the infant from emission of ultra toxic 
dioxin compounds from the Tooele incineration facility are not 
disputed in the record and the Board Order makes no fact findings 
on these facts. 
The second example cited by the Board, the issue of omission 
of open burning/open detonation from the risk assessment is 
misconstrued by the Board to be a fact issue when again it is an 
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issue of the legal significance of uncontested facts. The Board 
asserts that Petitioners should have marshalled opposing evidence 
on this issue in the form of the State Agency's prohibition of 
open burning and detonation while the Tooele facility is 
incinerating chemical weapons. However, this evidence is beside 
the point raised by Petitioners. Petitioners are concerned with 
the omission of OB/OD not because of a risk that occurs only from 
simultaneous occurrence of OB/OD and incineration but from the 
cumulative risk resulting from the deposition of dioxin compounds 
from both activities onto the same food sources where the poisons 
persist for decades, making the sequence of operations 
irrelevant. 
The third example cited by the Board is the issue of 
exclusion of dairy consumption from the risk assessment. Again, 
the Board misconstrues the nature of the issue raised on appeal. 
The issue raised by Petitioners is the legal significance of the 
State Agency and the Board approving operation of the Tooele 
facility based upon an incomplete risk assessment that omitted 
dairy consumption in the face of evidence available to the State 
that such dairy consumption was occurring. The record reflects 
that the State omitted dairy consumption not based on the 
conclusion that the information given the State was in error 
regarding the existence of dairy farming in the area, but based 
on the fact that the State did not know the name of the farmer 
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(but new how to find out). The fact that the State's later 
survey did not locate the farmer is not relevant to the fact that 
the State was told that such a farmer existed and did not 
subpoena the source. 
The Board's failure to address these facts and/or failure to 
recognize the legal significance of these facts is what is at 
issue in this appeal, not a challenge to fact findings made by 
the Board. Thus the marshalling of evidence rule is inapplicable 
to these dispositive issues of law on which Petitioners believe 
this appeal should be decided. 
There are factual determinations made by the Board with 
which Petitioners take issue, to be sure. Had the Petitioners 
done what the Board suggests in their Brief to marshall the 
evidence on both sides of each of these issues and analyzed each, 
Petitioners Opening Brief would have been several hundred pages 
long. Should this Court determine that one of these contested 
facts is potentially dispositive and that Petitioners have failed 
to marshall the evidence sufficiently in regard to such a fact 
issue, Petitioners respectfully suggest that, considering the 
public importance of this matter, Petitioners be allowed to file 
a supplement to their Brief to provide the summary of evidence 
required by this Court so that this matter may be determined on 
its merits in the public interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioners/Appellants 
request that the Court reverse the Board's decision and order 
that TOCDF's permit -- the specific permit for incineration of 
chemical weapons, not the underlying Depot permit that involves 
other waste management activities — be terminated. Petitioners 
of course do not request an order prohibiting ultimate disposal 
of the chemical weapons, which Petitioners are convinced can be 
safely accomplished using alternative non-incineration methods 
currently under review by the Army, Should the Court not find 
this appropriate, Petitioners request that the Court terminate 
EG&Gfs permit to operate TOCDF. Finally, should the Court find 
this inappropriate, Petitioners request that this matter be 
remanded to the Board for a full hearing that comports with due 
process requirements. 
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